Orateur
Jérôme Renault
(TSE (Université Toulouse 1 Capitole))
Description
We consider zero-sum dynamic games of information revelation. Each player controls a martingale of beliefs by choosing in each period a particular splitting (balayée) of the current belief, and the payoffs are determined by the limit beliefs. We introduce constraints on the set of available splittings, and characterize the value of the game as the unique solution of an extended Mertens-Zamir system: v=cav min (u,v)= vex max (u,v). In particular, we define the Mertens-Zamir transform of a real-valued matrix. Based on « Long Information Design » (Theoretical Economics 22) and « Splitting Games over finite sets » (Maths Prog 24), joint works with F. Koessler, M. Laclau and T. Tomala.
Author
Jérôme Renault
(TSE (Université Toulouse 1 Capitole))
