


Rigorous Foundations for Dual Attacks in Coding Theory

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Dual attacks in codes and lattices

Dual attacks solve

Decoding Problem (Codes)

| Shortest Vector Problem (Lattices)

→ Heart of security of cryptographic primitives

Lattices : Dual attacks impact Kyber (NIST standard)

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Lattices : Dual attacks impact Kyber (NIST standard)

Independence assumptions to analyse dual attacks

↓ (Valid?)

Not so much

Codes

Lattices

[CDMT22]

[DP23]

↓
Notice experimental differences

↓
Show the model cannot hold in some regimes

Goal of this talk

- 1) Why independence assumptions does not hold.
- 2) Give rigorous foundations for analyzing dual attacks.

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- 2 Theoretical explanation
- 3 A new model to analyze dual attacks

Setting for **Dual** attacks in Coding Theory

Linear code

\mathcal{C} a binary $[n, k]$ linear code: linear subspace of \mathbb{F}_2^n of dimension k .

Decoding problem at distance t (sparse)

- **Input:** $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ where $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{c} + \mathbf{e}$ with $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$ and $|\mathbf{e}| = t$
- **Output:** $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ such that $|\mathbf{e}| = t$ and $\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{e} \in \mathcal{C}$.

$|\mathbf{x}|$ is Hamming weight of \mathbf{x} : number of non-zero coordinates.

Dual code

$\mathcal{C}^\perp = \{\mathbf{h} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : \langle \mathbf{h}, \mathbf{c} \rangle = 0 \quad \forall \mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}\} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}^\perp$ is $[n, n - k]$ linear code

Dual attacks 1.0 (Statistical decoding [Al-Jabri, 2001])

- Compute all $\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp \subset \mathcal{C}^\perp = \boxed{\phantom{\mathbf{h}} w \text{ (sparse)}}$
- Compute $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{e}_i \mathbf{h}_i \rightarrow$ Biased toward 0

$$\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle) \triangleq \frac{|\{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp : \langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle = 0\}|}{|\mathcal{C}_w^\perp|} 2^{-1}$$


If $|\mathcal{C}_w^\perp| > \left(\frac{1}{\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle)} \right)^2 \Rightarrow$ Distinguish $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{c} + \mathbf{e}$ from random $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$

Estimate of bias $\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp$ ($\langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle$) (\mathcal{C} is random)

Theorem [CDMT22]

$$\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle) \approx \text{bias}_{\mathbf{h}' \in \mathcal{S}_w^n} (\langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h}' \rangle) = \frac{K_w^{(n)}(|\mathbf{e}|)}{\binom{n}{w}} \quad (K_w^{(n)} \text{ Krawtchouk poly.})$$

$$\text{Where } \mathcal{C}_w^\perp \subset \mathcal{S}_w^n \triangleq \{\mathbf{h}' \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : |\mathbf{h}'| = w\}$$



$$\text{Hold if: } \mathbb{E} [|\mathcal{C}_w^\perp|] > \left(\frac{1}{\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h}' \in \mathcal{S}_w^n} (\langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h}' \rangle)} \right)^2$$

Dual attacks 2.0 [CDMT, 2022]

- Split support in complementary part \mathcal{P} and $\mathcal{N} \rightarrow$ Recover $\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$?

- Compute $\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp \subset \mathcal{C}^\perp = \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\mathcal{P}} \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\mathcal{N}}$ w (sparse)

$$\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle$$

\Downarrow

$$\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle \rightarrow \text{biased toward 0}$$

- Find $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{|\mathcal{P}|}$ s.t. $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$ is the most biased toward 0

\rightarrow Hope maximum for $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$

Recovering $\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$

If maximum $\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle)$ given by $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$



Can recover $\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$

- 1) How big is $\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle)$?
- 2) How big is $\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle)$ for all other $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$'s?

1) Estimate of bias $\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle)$

Theorem [CDMT22]

$$\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle) \approx \frac{K_w^{(|\mathcal{N}|)} (|\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}|)}{\binom{|\mathcal{N}|}{w}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle) &= \text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle) \\ &\approx \text{bias}_{\mathbf{h}'_{\mathcal{N}} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}'_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle) \\ &= \frac{K_w^{(|\mathcal{N}|)} (|\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}|)}{\binom{|\mathcal{N}|}{w}} \end{aligned}$$

$$\rightarrow \text{Hold if: } \mathbb{E} [|\mathcal{C}_w^\perp|] > \left(\frac{1}{\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle)} \right)^2$$

2) Estimate of bias $\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp$ ($\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$), $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$

$$\begin{aligned}\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle &= \langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle \\ &= \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle \\ &= \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}} + \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle\end{aligned}$$

Independence Assumption


Assume $\langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}} + \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle$ independent when \mathbf{h} uniform in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp

\Downarrow

$$\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle \sim \text{Bern} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right), \quad \mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}$$

Sum up in a plot!

Under Independence assumption:



Sum up in a plot!

Under Independence assumption:





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Why independence assumption is false

Independence assumption

$$\Rightarrow \langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{D}} \rangle \sim \text{Bern}(1/2)$$



Linear dependency $\mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{D}}$ and $\mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}}$

$$\mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\top} = \mathbf{R} \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\top}$$

$$\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}^{\perp}$$

$$\downarrow$$
$$\mathbf{G} \mathbf{h}^{\top} = \mathbf{0}$$

$$\downarrow$$
$$\mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\top} + \mathbf{R} \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\top} = \mathbf{0} \text{ and } \mathbf{G}' \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\top} = \mathbf{0}$$

$$\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{D}} \rangle = \langle (\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{D}}) \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle$$

→ Assumption cannot hold!

About $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$

Gen. mat. $\mathcal{C} : \mathbf{G} =$

	\xleftrightarrow{s}	$\xleftrightarrow{n-s}$	
	\mathbf{Id}_s	\mathbf{R}	$\updownarrow s$
	$\mathbf{0}$	\mathbf{G}'	$\updownarrow k-s$

$\mathbf{h} =$

	w
$\underbrace{\hspace{50px}}_{\mathcal{P}}$	$\underbrace{\hspace{50px}}_{\mathcal{N}}$

$$\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle = \langle (\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}) \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle$$

Definition

$\mathcal{C}^{\mathcal{N}}$ is $[n-s, k-s]$ code of gen. mat. \mathbf{G}'

$$\rightarrow \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \in (\mathcal{C}^{\mathcal{N}})^{\perp}$$

$$\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle = \langle (\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}) \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}} + \mathbf{c}^{\mathcal{N}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{N}} \rangle \quad \forall \mathbf{c}^{\mathcal{N}} \in \mathcal{C}^{\mathcal{N}}$$

An expression for bias ($\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$)

Theorem of bias of error terms in RLPN

$$\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-s} N_i \frac{K_w^{(n-s)}(i)}{\binom{n-s}{w}}$$

where $N_i \triangleq |(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}) \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}} + \mathcal{C}^{\mathcal{N}} \cap \mathcal{S}_i^{n-s}|$ is weight enumerator

Proof: Poisson formula

→ Dominated by lowest i s.t. $N_i \neq 0$

$$\rightarrow \text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{P}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle) \approx \frac{1}{\binom{n-s}{w}} K_w^{(n-s)}(|\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{N}}|)$$

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Model for the bias

→ \mathcal{C} is random $[n, k]$ linear code,

$$\text{bias}_{\mathbf{h} \in \mathcal{C}_w^\perp} (\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{h} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{h} \rangle) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-s} N_i \frac{K_w^{(n-s)}(i)}{\binom{n-s}{w}}$$

where $N_i \triangleq |(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}_\mathcal{C}) \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{e}_\mathcal{N} + \mathcal{C}^\mathcal{N} \cap \mathcal{S}_i^{n-s}|$ is weight enumerator


⇓

Model

$$N_i \sim \text{Poisson} \left(\frac{\binom{n-s}{i}}{2^{n-k}} \right)$$

Experimental Results

Under Poisson model:



Conclusion

- This model can be used to analyze dual attacks
- [CDMT22] with a tweak \rightarrow originally claimed complexities!
- Can be adapted to Lattices

Thank you!