

# Computational Differential Privacy for Encrypted Databases Supporting Linear Queries

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October 17<sup>th</sup> 2023




1 Motivation

2 (Randomized) Functional Encryption

3 Differential Privacy

4 Results

# Motivation I



## Motivation II: Previous works

- Agarwal *et al.* [AHKM19]
  - ▶ Histogram queries.
  - ▶ Based on Structured encryption.
- Bakas *et al.* [BMD22]
  - ▶ Summation queries.
  - ▶ Based on Homomorphic encryption.
- Either Server **or** Analyst are malicious.
  - ▶ For Server security of encryption scheme.
  - ▶ For Analyst standard (statistical) differential privacy.
  - ▶ Collusion?

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# (Randomized) Functional encryption [BSW11, GJKS15]

**Alice**




Message  $m$   
Master key  $msk$

**Bob**




Function  $f$

## (Randomized) Functional encryption [BSW11, GJKS15]



# (Randomized) Functional encryption [BSW11, GJKS15]






# Security of (Randomized) Functional encryption

- Indistinguishingability vs. Simulation-based
  - ▶ Simulation-based stronger and more composable
  - ▶ Impossibility results for simulation-based
  
- Selective vs. (Semi)Adaptive
  - ▶ (Semi)Adaptive stronger
  - ▶ Impossibility results for (Semi)adaptive

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# Differential Privacy [DMNS06]

Usual data analysis:



# Differential Privacy [DMNS06]

Private data analysis:



For example

$$\underbrace{\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle}_{\text{noisy statistic}} + e$$

statistic

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statistic

For  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'$  adjacent databases (statistical property)

$$\Pr [\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \cdot \Pr [\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}') \in S] + \delta$$

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## Results I: Generic results

- Generic RFE scheme instantiating “statistical” private mechanism
  - ▶  $\mathcal{M}'(x, f) = f(x) + D$  a statistical DP mechanism
  - ▶ RFE such that  $f(x) + D \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_x, sk_f)$

## Results I: Generic results

- Generic RFE scheme instantiating “statistical” private mechanism
  - ▶  $\mathcal{M}'(x, f) = f(x) + D$  a statistical DP mechanism
  - ▶ RFE such that  $f(x) + D \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_x, sk_f)$
- Result for generic functional encryption

### Theorem

*If the randomized functional encryption scheme RFE instantiating  $\mathcal{M}'$  (which is statistically DP for  $Q$  queries) holds simulation soundness for 1 database, it is computationally differentially private for 1 **encrypted database** and  $Q$  queries.*

- ▶ Proof intuition: Reduction to the “statistical” mechanism by using simulators from RFE



## Results II: Randomized Inner-Product Functional Encryption

- Instantiation for Randomized Inner Product functional encryption
  - ▶ From generic (deterministic) Inner Product functional encryption and generic distribution.

**Setup**<sup>RIPFE</sup>( $1^\kappa$ ) :

$$\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}^\ell$$

$$(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}^{\text{IPFE}}(1^\kappa)$$

$$\text{Output } (\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \text{param}^{\text{RIPFE}})$$

$$= ((\mathbf{u}, \text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}), \text{param}^{\text{IPFE}})$$

**KeyGen**<sup>RIPFE</sup>( $\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \mathbf{y}$ ) :

$$e_y \leftarrow D$$

$$u'_y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$$

$$d'_y \leftarrow e_y + u'_y$$

$$sk_y \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, \mathbf{y})$$

$$zk_y \leftarrow \langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + u'_y$$

$$\text{Output } sk_y^{\text{RIPFE}} = (d'_y, sk_y, zk_y)$$

**Enc**<sup>RIPFE</sup>( $\text{msk}^{\text{RIPFE}}, \mathbf{x}$ ) :

$$\mathbf{d} \leftarrow \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{u}$$

$$c_d \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\text{IPFE}}(\text{msk}^{\text{IPFE}}, \mathbf{d})$$

$$\text{Output } c_d$$

**Dec**<sup>RIPFE</sup>( $c_d, sk_y^{\text{RIPFE}}$ ) :

$$\langle \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{y} \rangle \leftarrow \text{Dec}^{\text{IPFE}}(c_d, sk_y)$$

$$\text{Output } \langle \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{y} \rangle + d'_y - zk_y$$

## Results III: Implementation

- Proof of concept implementation using the DDH-based IPFE scheme in [ALMT20] coded in C using the CiFEr library [BHST21].

	Database entries	msk	$c_x$	$sk_y$
Sizes	100	150 KB	37 KB	1 KB
	1 000	1 MB	375 KB	1 KB
	10 000	14 MB	3 MB	1 KB
	100 000	146 MB	36 MB	1 KB

Table: Sizes of each element.

## Results III: Implementation

- Proof of concept implementation using the DDH-based IPFE scheme in [ALMT20] coded in C using the CiFEr library [BHST21].

	Database entries	SetUp	Encrypt	KeyGen	Decrypt
Comp. time	100	1.0236 s	0.9993 s	0.0001 s	0.5127 s
	1 000	9.9442 s	9.9193 s	0.0001 s	0.5799 s
	10 000	95.784 s	95.6347 s	0.0024 s	0.6206 s
	100 000	960.79 s	959.62 s	0.0252 s	2.211 s

Table: Times computed using ONE core i9-12900K (3.2Ghz).

Thank you for your attention

Questions?

Future works:

- Quadratic functionalities
- Dynamic databases
- Proof with Indistinguishability-based security



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