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SUMMARY:Clémence Bouvier (Inria Paris): New uses in Symmetric Cryptograph
 y: An equation between Practical needs and Mathematical concepts
DTSTART:20220623T090000Z
DTEND:20220623T100000Z
DTSTAMP:20260614T161900Z
UID:indico-event-6737@indico.math.cnrs.fr
DESCRIPTION:The use of symmetric cryptography enables to provide various s
 ecurity features such as confidentiality\, authentication or hashing by co
 mbining a low-level primitive (i.e. a permutation or a block cipher)\, wit
 h a mode of operation. In this presentation we will focus on the design an
 d security analysis of some symmetric primitives.\n\nNew symmetric primiti
 ves are designed to be executed in abstract contexts such as zero-knowledg
 e proof systems (ZK)\, widely used in crypto-currency applications such as
  Bitcoin or Ethereum. ZK protocols are algorithms involving several partie
 s that allow a prover to convince a verifier that he knows a secret withou
 t revealing it. These protocols have\, in particular\, highlighted the nee
 d to minimise the number of multiplications performed by the primitive in 
 large finite fields. As the number of the so-called Arithmetization-Orient
 ed (AO) designs increases\, it is important to better understand the prope
 rties of their underlying operations.\n\nFirst\, we will study the algebra
 ic degree of one of the first such block ciphers\, namely MiMC\, that is m
 ainly composed a low-degree power permutation (usually the cube).  We wil
 l show that\, while the univariate degree increases predictably with the n
 umber of rounds\, the algebraic degree has a much more complex behaviour\,
  and simply stays constant during some rounds. In particular\, we will pro
 vide a precise guarantee on the algebraic degree of this cipher\, and then
  on the minimal complexity for integral attacks. In addition to this mathe
 matical analysis\, we will also be interested in practical attacks on othe
 r primitives like Rescue or Poseidon.\n\nFinally\, from the cryptanalysis 
 of these different designs we will see how we came up with our own family 
 of ZK-friendly hash functions: Anemoi. With this new family\, we will push
  further the frontier in understating the design principles behind AO hash
  functions. Indeed\, we will rely on a mathematical concept\, namely the C
 CZ equivalence\, to design our main component: the Flystel.\n\nhttps://ind
 ico.math.cnrs.fr/event/6737/
LOCATION:001 (batiment I)
URL:https://indico.math.cnrs.fr/event/6737/
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