

# All Or Nothing Transform - Secret Sharing (AONT-SS)

## A new secure multi-cloud storage scheme

Dayane Horkos

Astran  
EPITA

Supervised by: Gilles Seghaier (Astran), Prof. Ludovic Perret(LRE, EPITA)

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# Clouds are everywhere

User/Company    Cloud provider



Elasticity, cheap storage capacity



Vulnerable to cyberattacks  
Problems in terms of availability

Single cloud

User/Company    Cloud providers




Resilience, Availability




Multi-cloud

# Presenting Astran and its usecase



# Problem



## Contributions and State of art

Design a new **Multi-Cloud Storage scheme** with the following requirements:


- ① **Goal:** Achieve confidentiality against proxy
- ② **Constraint:** Avoid complex management of encryption keys
- ③ **Means:** Requires some computations on the user's side

Examples of Multi-Cloud Storage schemes: [Resch and Plank, Usenix'11, Bessani et al., ACM'13, Zkik et al., IJCAC'17, Megouache et al., HCIS'20, Lafourcade et al., ESORICS'24]

## AONT [Rivest, FSE'97]

## Definition

An All-Or-Nothing Transform *AONT* [Rivest, FSE'97] is a transformation  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$  such that



## AONT-RP [Resch and Plank, Usenix'11, Chen et al., Africacrypt'2017]

The *AONT - RP*.Hide algorithm:


$$k \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{K} = \text{KeyGen}(\lambda)$$

$$c_0 \leftarrow \text{SKE.Enc}_k(\mathcal{D})$$

$$c_1 \leftarrow k \oplus h(c_0)$$


$$c = \text{AONT}(\mathcal{D}) = c_0 \| c_1 = d_0 \| \dots \| d_l$$

return  $c$



## PSS and IDA

## Definition

**Perfect Secret Sharing Scheme** $(k, n)$  threshold schemeProvides **information theoretic security**Share size:  $|\mathcal{D}_i| = |\mathcal{D}|$ **Information Dispersal Algorithm** $(k, n)$  threshold schemeSacrifices perfect security for **space efficiency**Share size:  $|\mathcal{D}_i| = |\mathcal{D}|/k$ 

New protocol **AONT-SS**:

- ① Use an **AONT** to transform the data and dilute the key.
- ② Create a tradeoff between security and space:
  - Use **PSS** on the secret output to provide confidentiality.
  - Use **IDA** on the public output to provide space efficiency.
- ③ Use a Certificate Authority to vouch for the public keys of each entity.

## AONT – SS Upload ( $\mathcal{D}, index$ )

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User 

Proxy 

Cloud Provider  $i$  

$d_0 || \dots || d_l \leftarrow AONT.Hide(\mathcal{D})$

$s_1, \dots, s_n \leftarrow PSS.Share(d_j, n, k)$


$e_i \leftarrow PKE.E_{pk_i}(s_i)$

$AONT(\mathcal{D}, j), e_i$



## AONT – SS Upload ( $\mathcal{D}, index$ )

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User 

$$d_0 || \dots || d_l \leftarrow AONT.Hide(\mathcal{D})$$

$$s_1, \dots, s_n \leftarrow PSS.Share(d_j, n, k)$$

$$e_i \leftarrow PKE.E_{pk_i}(s_i)$$

$$\xrightarrow{AONT(\mathcal{D}, j), e_i}$$

Proxy 


$$r_i \leftarrow IDA.Disp(AONT(\mathcal{D}, j), n, k)$$

$$1 \leq i \leq n$$

$$\xrightarrow{r_i, e_i}$$

Cloud Provider  $i$  

## AONT – SS Upload ( $\mathcal{D}, index$ )

User 

$$d_0 || \dots || d_l \leftarrow AONT.Hide(\mathcal{D})$$

$$s_1, \dots, s_n \leftarrow PSS.Share(d_j, n, k)$$

$$e_i \leftarrow PKE.E_{pk_i}(s_i)$$

$$\xrightarrow{AONT(\mathcal{D}, j), e_i}$$

Proxy 

$$r_i \leftarrow IDA.Disp(AONT(\mathcal{D}, j), n, k)$$

$$1 \leq i \leq n$$

$$\xrightarrow{r_i, e_i}$$

Cloud Provider  $i$  

$$s_i \leftarrow PKE.D_{sk_i}(e_i)$$

$$\text{store } (r_i, s_i)$$

# Proof of privacy

## New theorem

Assuming an honest-but-curious adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{AONT-SS}}$  representing the proxy and  $k - 1$  cloud providers, the scheme AONT - SS has **IND security** when:

- PKE is IND-CPA
- PSS has perfect security
- AONT has IND security

# Proof of privacy

## New theorem


Assuming an honest-but-curious adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{AONT-SS}}$  representing the proxy and  $k - 1$  cloud providers, the scheme  $\text{AONT} - \text{SS}$  has **IND security** when:

- $\text{PKE}$  is  $\text{IND-CPA}$
- $\text{PSS}$  has perfect security
- $\text{AONT}$  has  $\text{IND}$  security

## Proof sketch

It is sufficient to prove that  $\text{AONT} - \text{RP}$  has  $\text{IND}$  security in the  $\text{ROM}$  when  $\text{SKE}$  is  $\text{IND-CPA}$ . Consider  $G_0$  the game of  $\text{IND-CPA}$  of  $\text{SKE}$ ,  $G_1$  the game of  $\text{IND}$  security of  $\text{AONT} - \text{RP}$ . The proof will proceed via game hopping and will consist of three steps.

- ① We modify  $G_1$  to get  $G_2$ , a new game with two keys, one for the encryption and one for the xor operation.
- ② Reduction from game  $G_0$  to  $G_2$ :  $\Pr(\mathcal{B} \text{ wins } G_0) = \Pr(\mathcal{A}_{AONT-RP} \text{ wins in } G_2)$ .



- ③ We compare the advantages of the adversaries in both games  $G_1$  and  $G_2$ :  $|\Pr(\mathcal{A}_{AONT-RP} \text{ wins in } G_2) - \Pr(\mathcal{A}_{AONT-RP} \text{ wins in } G_1)| < \epsilon$ .

# Conclusion

## Results:

- We have presented a new multi-cloud scheme  $AONT - SS$
- We extended  $AONT - SS$  to another type of adversary: malicious with abort
- We also started studying how this scheme would be integrated into Astran

## Future directions:

- Ongoing paper
- Thesis about Multi-Cloud Storage ( $MCS$ ) schemes

*Thank You for your attention!*

Feel free to connect with me

LinkedIn:



Email: `dayane.horkos@astran.ai`

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